Complete-rent-dissipation contest design

Tomohiko Kawamori

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 232, issue C

Abstract: We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that exhibit complete rent dissipation. If the prize values are observable by the contest designer, for any value tuple, we show that there exists a CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. If the values are unobservable by the contest designer, we show that there exists no CSF that exhibits complete dissipation in some equilibrium for any value tuple.

Keywords: Contest success function; Complete rent dissipation; Observable or unobservable values; Equivalence in aggregate efforts across equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:232:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523003713

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346

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