On the core of a patent licensing game

Satoshi Nakada and Ryo Shirakawa

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 233, issue C

Abstract: This note revisits the impossibility result shown by Watanabe and Muto (2008) that almost all outcomes cannot be in the core of a patent licensing game. To overcome this difficulty, we consider a weaker stability concept by restricting objections against payoff distributions to the ones made under an exogenously fixed payment scheme and a payment rate. In contrast to their result, we demonstrate that the coalition structures in which licensee firms are the majority can be stable in this sense. However, such a possibility result breaks down if we allow negotiations on the payment rate.

Keywords: Patent licensing games; Core allocation; Impossibility result (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D43 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:233:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523003993

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111374

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