Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem

Chih-Chun Yang

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 233, issue C

Abstract: In the bilateral trade problem, we investigate strategically simple mechanisms (Börgers and Li, 2019) where there may be strategies that are weakly dominated for all utility types. We show that neither local dictatorship, nor ex post individual rationality is satisfied in every strategically simple mechanism.

Keywords: Implementation; Strategically simple; Weak dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:233:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523004408

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111414

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