Two results on auctions with endogenous entry

Serafin Grundl and Yu Zhu

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 234, issue C

Abstract: First, the value distribution does not depend on the number of entrants under an independence assumption on entry signals. Second, separability of unobserved auction heterogeneity and private values carries over from potential bidders to entrants under several information structures.

Keywords: Auction; Unobserved heterogeneity; Entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C57 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:234:y:2024:i:c:s0165176523005268

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111500

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