Platform acquisitions and Nash bargaining

Federico Etro () and Serge Moresi

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 235, issue C

Abstract: A merger between a device-driven platform and a service developer engaged in bilateral negotiations with competing platforms can be welfare enhancing. The merger increases platform competition and can benefit consumers even when it increases the bargaining leverage of the service provider vis-à-vis rival platforms and generates opposing effects on the prices of devices and services on different platforms.

Keywords: Platform competition; Mergers; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:235:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524000181

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111534

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