An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting

Wesley H. Holliday

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 236, issue C

Abstract: In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size.

Keywords: Social choice theory; Impossibility theorem; Positive involvement; Condorcet winner; Condorcet loser; Resolvability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:236:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524000727

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111589

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