Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

Robbert Fokkink and Hans de Munnik

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 236, issue C

Abstract: We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Impact of boycotts; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:236:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524000892

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

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