Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students

Artemii Lomakin, Kamil Minibaev and Alexander Nesterov

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 237, issue C

Abstract: We examine incentive compatibility of various school choice mechanisms as measured by the number of manipulating students. We find that Boston with Skips Mechanism, Secure Boston Mechanism, and Chinese Mechanism may have more manipulating students than Boston Mechanism. Similarly, Taiwan Mechanism with smaller deductions may induce more manipulating students than Taiwan Mechanism with larger deductions. Computational simulations show that on average Secure Boston Mechanism and especially Chinese Mechanism have fewer manipulating students than Boston Mechanism, while Boston with Skips Mechanism performs slightly worse than Boston Mechanism.

Keywords: Market design; School choice; College admissions; Manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001307

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111647

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