Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules

Ryoga Doi and Noriaki Okamoto

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 237, issue C

Abstract: In a voting model with three alternatives, we show that for any non-Borda scoring rule, there exists at least one preference profile under which the scoring rule selects a Condorcet loser, whereas the plurality rule does not.

Keywords: Borda rule; Plurality rule; Scoring rules; Condorcet loser (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001356

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111652

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