Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions

Roberto Burguet and József Sákovics

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 237, issue C

Abstract: We provide the equilibrium strategies of sellers setting reserve prices in their auctions, when bidders can simultaneously participate in several auctions at a time.

Keywords: Clock auction; Reserve price; Synchronous bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001393

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111656

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