Asymmetric conflict games with an extremist

Youngseok Park and Colin Campbell

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 237, issue C

Abstract: This paper extends the conflict game of Baliga and Sjöström (2012) by allowing for an asymmetry between players. We demonstrate that (i) a player with a greater net gain from playing a hawkish action is more likely to play a hostile action and thereby the risk of war increases with it, and that (ii) an extremist cannot manipulate the conflict via cheap-talk message whenever the properties of actions are asymmetric between the players.

Keywords: Conflict games; Asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524001423
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001423

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111659

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().