Optimal discounts in green public procurement

Olga Chiappinelli and Gyula Seres

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 238, issue C

Abstract: We provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.

Keywords: Public procurement; Environmental policy; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001885

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705

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