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Lame duck law enforcement

Shannon R. Losak and Michael Makowsky

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 238, issue C

Abstract: Election losses for incumbent sheriffs result in lame ducks who oversee local law enforcement for as long as 10 months before the next sheriff takes office. Monthly arrest rates decline 11% subsequent to a primary election loss and 20.3% after losing a general election; violent crime arrests drop 24.8% in the two months following a general election loss. Our results demonstrate the costs of electoral turnover where day-to-day duties are sensitive to effort and conscientiousness.

Keywords: Sheriffs; Elections; Lame duck (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001903

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111707

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