Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition

Satoshi Matsuzawa

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 239, issue C

Abstract: This article investigates optimal incentive power for team competition. We show that the optimal incentive power, represented by the elasticity of a sharing rule, is proportional to the firm’s output elasticity with respect to teams’ output and team size.

Keywords: Team production; Relative performance evaluation; Free-rider problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002167

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111733

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