Financial center expertise, investors’ expectations and the new European anti-money laundering authority

Bruno Fiesenig, Leonard Grebe and Dirk Schiereck

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 239, issue C

Abstract: The decision to establish the European authority for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AMLA) in Frankfurt sets the stage for a natural experiment, offering insight into how the decision for the AMLA headquarter location and the future proximity to regulatory oversight influence the market value of financial institutions. Our results show that, while the introduction of a regulatory institution in Europe appears to have a significant positive impact on European markets, this effect, however, appears to be mitigated in countries directly affected by the decision of the geographical location of the new founded authority.

Keywords: Anti-money laundering; Banks; Financial institutions; Stock markets; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G15 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002210

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111738

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