Firing multinational CEOs

Adam Hal Spencer

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 239, issue C

Abstract: This note documents an empirical regularity: CEOs of multinational firms are fired more frequently than those of non-multinationals. Possible mechanisms are explored. Some evidence is found consistent with the two types of firms drawing from different pools of managerial talent, as well as multinationals firing more frequently to protect sunk costs.

Keywords: FDI; Multinational firms; Executives; CEOs; Forced turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F23 G30 G34 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002507

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111766

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