Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures

Takaaki Abe

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 240, issue C

Abstract: We provide axiomatic characterizations of three equal surplus sharing values—the CIS, ENSC, and ED values—within the class of games with coalition structures. Our approach employs the “splitting” axiom, introduced by Casajus (2009). We axiomatically compare these three values with the value concepts proposed by Aumann and Drèze (1974) and Casajus (2009).

Keywords: Axiom; Coalition structure; Cooperative game; Equal surplus sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:240:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002593

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111775

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