A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 240, issue C

Abstract: Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

Keywords: Matching markets; Stability; Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:240:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002684

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

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