Characterization of Top Trading Cycles with single-dipped preferences

Xinquan Hu and Jun Zhang

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 241, issue C

Abstract: In the object reallocation model, when agents’ preferences are unrestricted, Ekici (2024) proves that the top trading cycles is the unique mechanism that is individually-rational, pair-efficient, and strategyproof. We prove that this characterization remains true when agents’ preferences are single-dipped.

Keywords: Object reallocation model; Top trading cycles; Single-dipped; Pair efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:241:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003069

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111822

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