All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

Cemil Selcuk

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 242, issue C

Abstract: In a competitive market with budget-constrained buyers, an equilibrium where sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. If budgets are not too limited, then all-pay auctions emerge as the preferred selling format.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Directed search; Budget constraints; Competing auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003707

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111886

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