Step-by-step negotiations and the Nash bargaining solution: Efficiency-free characterizations

Kensei Nakamura

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 242, issue C

Abstract: Real-world bargainings often proceed step-by-step: the agents make intermediate agreements today and continue to negotiate tomorrow to reach a final agreement. We consider two natural properties of the bargaining solutions in such step-by-step negotiations and show that the Nash solution is the only solution that satisfies either of them, a very weak axiom of individual rationality, and Nash’s axioms except for Pareto optimality.

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; Nash solution; Efficiency-free characterizations; Step-by-step negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003720

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111888

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