Credibility of central banks in monetary economies

Kohei Iwasaki

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 243, issue C

Abstract: This paper develops a model of money to study interventions by a central bank that can monitor the money holdings of agents. I show that an off-the-equilibrium intervention enhances the use of money and stabilizes its values.

Keywords: Money; Central bank digital currency; Self-fulfilling expectations; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E40 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004117

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111927

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