Packaging for allocation

Peng Liu and Sijia Xu

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 243, issue C

Abstract: The allocation of indivisible objects is studied where individuals claim packages of them and a rule determines the number of each package to be allocated. There exists a rule satisfying feasibility, efficiency, and composition down (or composition up) if and only if the set of institutionally feasible packages is a hierarchy, i.e., for any pair of packages, either that they are disjoint or that one contains the other. Moreover, on a hierarchy, the unique rules satisfying the aforementioned properties are priority rules where a package has higher priority than another if it contains the other.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; Hierarchy; Package; Priority rule; Composition up; Composition down (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004166

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111932

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