Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: A comment

Will Sandholtz and Andrew Tai

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 243, issue C

Abstract: We note that the proofs of Bird (1984), the first to show group strategy-proofness of top trading cycles (TTC), require correction. We provide a counterexample to a critical claim and present corrected proofs in the spirit of the originals. We also present a novel proof of strong group strategy-proofness using the corrected results.

Keywords: Matching; Top trading cycles; Group strategy-proofness; Group incentive compatibility; House swapping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004221

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111938

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