Communication in stag hunt games: When does it really help?

Marina Agranov

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 244, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines whether the effectiveness of cheap-talk communication in Stag-Hunt-like games is influenced by payoff asymmetry between players. We find that communication improves efficiency when both players benefit from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Otherwise, its impact is limited, regardless of whether one or both players communicate their intended actions.

Keywords: Stag Hunt game; Communication; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:244:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004750

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111991

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