Monopsony and rent sharing: Evidence from Italian hiring subsidies

Lia Pacelli and Filippo Passerini

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 244, issue C

Abstract: We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.

Keywords: Monopsony; Labor market concentration; Hiring subsidies; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J38 J42 J48 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524004865
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:244:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004865

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112002

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().