Competition for publication-based rewards

Mike Felgenhauer

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 244, issue C

Abstract: This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process.

Keywords: Experimentation; Persuasion; Manipulation; Information acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524005019
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:244:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524005019

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().