Investment and endogenous efficiency in a contest

Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu and Tore Nilssen ()

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 247, issue C

Abstract: Contests are ubiquitous but do not happen in a vacuum. Rivals can prepare themselves for the contest to improve their ultimate chance of victory. Two contestants with different prize values play an all-pay auction and can invest to improve the efficiency of their own effort in the contest. We show that at most one player will invest, and that two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria exist depending upon the identity of the investor. If the high-value player invests, then investment reinforces the initial asymmetry; investment by the low-value player turns the tables on the initially advantaged rival. The investment opportunity moves competition away from the contest, resulting in less expected contest effort than would occur without investment.

Keywords: All-pay auction; Pre-contest investment; Endogenous efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006153

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112131

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