Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness

Jacob Coreno and Di Feng

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 247, issue C

Abstract: In the object reallocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) showed that Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is the unique rule satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. We show that the uniqueness remains true if strategy-proofness is weakened to truncation-proofness.

Keywords: Housing markets; Top Trading Cycles; Endowment manipulation; Truncation-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006438

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112159

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