Group conflict, group composition, and policy convergence

Karl Wärneryd

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 247, issue C

Abstract: We consider groups that compete to set policy, and show that there may be an incentive to change group composition with respect to policy preferences in such a fashion that equilibrium policies ultimately converge across groups.

Keywords: Conflict; Contest; Groups; Median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006463

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112162

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