Comparative statics in strategic form games

Juan F. Escobar

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 250, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents new comparative statics results for strategic form games. We introduce a dominance condition that ensures payoff shocks result in increased Nash equilibria, even in games without strategic complementarities. Our results are easy to apply and expand the range of games where lattice theoretic tools can be applied. We derive new comparative statics results for contests and Cournot games.

Keywords: Comparative statics; Strategic form games; Lattice theory; Contests; Cournot games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:250:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525000849

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112247

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