Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set

Takuto Kaneko and Satoshi Nakada

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 250, issue C

Abstract: We provide new axiomatic foundations for the Core of TU-games with a fixed player set. Our main axiom is referred to as nullified reduced game consistency, which is a natural counterpart of reduced game consistency in the setting with a universal player set. We consider three types of nullified reduced game consistency axioms, each of which corresponds to the max-, complement-, and projection-reduced game consistency in the literature. We show that each property, together with other standard axioms, characterizes the Core. As a result, our characterization results uncover implicit restrictions on solutions imposed by consistency in the universal player set.

Keywords: TU-games; Core; Axiomatization; Fixed player set; Nullified games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:250:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001119

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112274

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