Can I afford to remember less than you? Best responses in repeated additive games

Franziska Lesigang, Christian Hilbe and Nikoleta E. Glynatsi

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 250, issue C

Abstract: In this paper, we study best responses in repeated additive games among two players. A stage game is additive if each player’s payoff is the sum of two components, and each component only depends on the action of a single player. We suppose one player’s strategy depends on the co-player’s last n actions. Then we prove that the other player has a best response that only depends on their own n−1 actions. That is, for an important sub-class of games and strategies, players can achieve maximum payoffs even with less memory than their opponent.

Keywords: Repeated games; Best response; Additive games; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:250:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001375

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112300

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