The three-player lowest unique number game

Balázs Sentes

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 251, issue C

Abstract: This paper characterizes the unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the three-player version Lowest Unique Number Game. In this game, each player chooses a positive integer simultaneously and the player with the lowest unique number wins. The equilibrium mixing is shown to have full support and it is characterized by a constant hazard rate which is around .46.

Keywords: Integer game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:251:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001363

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112299

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