Interim pre-play communication

Dino Gerardi

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 251, issue C

Abstract: We study communication in games with incomplete information, four or more players and rational parameters. We show that every communication equilibrium can be implemented with unmediated communication taking place at the interim stage, i.e., after the players learn their types.

Keywords: Unmediated communication; Communication equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:251:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001570

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112320

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