An ordinal solution to King Solomon’s dilemma

Joshua S. Gans and Richard Holden

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 252, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines mechanisms that can resolve ownership disputes when some agents know who the legitimate owner is, but others do not. The mechanism proposed is called “Solomonic” because it resolves the biblical dispute facing King Solomon over the true mother of a baby. It involves two stages of messages (claims) and yields truthful revelation using only ordinal restrictions on preferences.

Keywords: Subgame perfect implementation; Mechanism design; Ownership; Dispute resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 K11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:252:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001703

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112333

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