Cartel stability with quality-anchored buyers

Iwan Bos, Berardino Cesi and Marco Marini

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 254, issue C

Abstract: This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.

Keywords: Captive consumers; Cartel stability; Collusion; Quality-anchored buyers; Vertical product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Cartel Stability with Quality-Anchored Buyers (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525002861

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112449

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