Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions

Oliver Kirchkamp, Shulin Liu, Wladislaw Mill and Xiangyu Wang

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 254, issue C

Abstract: We analyze the effects of spite in first-price all-pay auctions. We find that symmetric equilibria of spiteful bidders increase in spite, and that spite could explain overbidding. We compare the symmetric equilibria of spiteful bidders in first-price all-pay auctions with those of spiteful bidders in second-price all-pay auctions, as well as with those in first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions (FPA and SPA).

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Overbidding; Spite (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s016517652500299x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112462

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