The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options

Zhengyang Cai

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 254, issue C

Abstract: In the Gale–Shapley marriage model where agents cannot declare potential partners as unacceptable, the number of manipulating agents of the man-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is minimum among all stable mechanisms if and only if men are fewer than women. When the numbers of agents on both sides of the market are equal, we demonstrate that the deferred acceptance mechanism might not possess the aforementioned least manipulability property. However, if the preference profile is symmetrically tiered, as previously studied by Kesten (2010), and there are no more than three agents in the last tier, the deferred acceptance mechanism still possesses that property.

Keywords: Deferred acceptance mechanism; Manipulability; Stability; Outside options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525003222

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112485

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