Strategyproof and fair allocation of a perfectly divisible private commodity with (restricted) single-dipped preferences

Ernest Lartey Osei and Dipjyoti Majumdar

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 255, issue C

Abstract: We study strategyproof allocation of a perfectly divisible private commodity when preferences are single-dipped. Along with strategyproofness, we impose the following properties: Pareto efficiency and equal treatment of equals. Over the entire domain of single dipped preferences the three properties are incompatible. We consider a specific allocation rule — the equal sharing rule which works as follows: at any profile of preferences the rule divides the commodity equally among all agents who report receiving the entire commodity as their top ranked alternative. If there is no such agent, then the rule divides equally among all agents. We identify a sufficient domain restriction based on the location of the dips. We show that on our restricted domain a rule satisfies the three properties if and only if it is the equal sharing rule.

Keywords: Strategyproofness; Pareto efficiency; Equal treatment of equals; Single-dipped preferences; Restricted domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:255:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525003039

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112466

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