Lobbying for cheaper inputs? Political economy of export taxation

Jean-Marc Solleder and Olga Solleder

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 255, issue C

Abstract: This paper investigates the political economy determinants of export taxes using a theoretical framework, which extends the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model to account for input-output linkages and lobbying by both intermediate and final goods producers. The model predicts that downstream industries may lobby for export taxes on intermediate goods to reduce domestic input costs, while upstream sectors counter-lobby against such measures. We test this prediction using product-level data covering 16 countries, combining information on export taxes, input requirements, production, and trade elasticities. The results provide robust evidence that lobbying incentives significantly influence the imposition of export taxes.

Keywords: Export taxes; Trade policy; Intermediate goods; Value chain; Political economy; Organized interests; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:255:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525003799

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112542

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