An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information

Sumit Goel and Jeffrey Zeidel

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 255, issue C

Abstract: We study k-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with n agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest k−2 valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare increases monotonically as we go from second-price auction (k=2) to lowest-price auction (k=n), with the first-price auction achieving the highest worst-case welfare.

Keywords: k-price auctions; Nash equilibrium; Worst-case welare; Second-price auction; First-price auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:255:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004021

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112565

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