A note on aggregating preferences for redistribution

Daniel R. Carroll, André Victor D. Luduvice and Eric R. Young

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: The policy predictions of standard heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models are often at odds with observed policies. We use the General Social Survey to investigate the drivers of individuals’ preferences over taxes and redistribution. We find that these preferences are more strongly associated with political identity than with economic status. We discuss the implications for quantitative macroeconomic models with endogenous policy determination.

Keywords: Political economy; Redistribution; Heterogeneous agents; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525003726

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112535

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