Contests with endogenous claims: Conflict dissipation

Daniel Cardona, Marc Claveria-Mayol and Clara Ponsatí
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Claveria Mayol

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: We examine a one-dimensional policy contest between two agents that takes place in two steps: first, agents choose policy proposals; then, they engage in a Tullock contest in which one of the proposals prevails. We show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (in undominated strategies), in which both contestants moderate their claims equally. When the contest is sufficiently competitive, proposals converge to the center, and conflict dissipates. Expected payoffs increase with the degree of competitiveness (up to an upper bound), while aggregate effort increases to a maximum and then decreases.

Keywords: Policy contest; Strategic restraint; Moderation; Conflict dissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004094

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112572

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