Modifications of several axiomatizations of the Shapley value by weakening the efficiency axiom

Erfang Shan, Liying Kang and Jilei Shi

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: The Shapley value is one of the most popular allocation rules for cooperative games. In this paper we modify several well-known axiomatizations of the Shapley value in the literature by relaxing the efficiency axiom to the gain-loss axiom.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Shapley value; Gain-loss; Balanced contributions; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004203

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112583

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