Bounded rationality in one-player guessing games

Shahriar Akhavan Hezaveh

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: This study examines deviations from optimal play in a one-player guessing game with a distance-based payoff function. Nearly half of the observed non-optimal choices follow simple numeric patterns: choosing identical numbers or selecting one as half of the other. These may reflect joint optimization against an unknown target or best-response reasoning as if facing an imagined opponent. Cognitive Reflection Test scores predict behavioral transitions from unstructured to patterned, and from patterned to optimal choices. The findings suggest that many seemingly suboptimal decisions reflect structured, payoff-sensitive reasoning shaped by how participants internally represent the game’s structure.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Guessing games; Beauty contest games; Cognitive abilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004525

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112615

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