Endogenous task allocation and intrafirm bargaining

Martyna Marczak and Thomas Beissinger

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of overhiring.

Keywords: Task approach; Search and matching; Stole-Zwiebel bargaining; Overhiring; Wage bargaining; Elasticity of complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 E23 J23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004677

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112630

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