When half a boycott makes a winner: On Eurovision voting

Alexander Frug

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 256, issue C

Abstract: Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback — however small — is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party.

Keywords: Boycott; Weak backlash; Voting; Coordination failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004768

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639

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