Layoffs and lemons over the business cycle
Emi Nakamura ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 1, 55-58
This paper develops a simple model in which unemployment arises from a combination of selection and bad luck. During recessions, the proportion of workers who are laid off due to low productivity declines during recessions, diminishing the adverse signaling effect of an unemployment spell. Wage regressions estimated using the Displaced Workers Supplement support this basic prediction of the model.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:55-58
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().