Equilibrium in a dynamic game of capital accumulation with the overtaking criterion
Andrzej Nowak ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 233-237
A stationary overtaking equilibrium is constructed for a class of discrete-time games of capital accumulation. A verification of the equilibrium properties is made using some functional characterization of the overtaking optimality in dynamic programming.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:233-237
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